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Abstract
Mental models, informal representations of reality, provide an appealing explanation for the
apparently non-rational security decisions of information technology users. Although users may be
attempting to make secure decisions, the use of incomplete or incorrect information security mental
models as a shortcut to decision making may lead to undesirable results. We describe mental models
about viruses and hackers drawing on data from a survey of 609 adult IT users and link these to
security behaviours and perceptions. We find that there are potentially just a small number of
common security beliefs and suggest that accommodating mental models during security design may
be more beneficial to long-term security than expecting users to change to accommodate security
requirements.
Keywords information security, mental models, human factors, home computer, mobile device
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1 Introduction
Mental models are informal representations of reality that people use to understand their
environment and interactions. Craik (1943) theorised that mental models are the way in which
humans interact with the world and suggested that rather than relying on formal rules and logic,
people often make decisions based on their general knowledge and understanding of the situation.
Because individuals have limited working memory, mentals models serve to minimise the load on
memory with simplified and selective representations of reality encoded in the models (Johnson-Laird
et al. 1998). Thus, these models are not intended to be complete – suggesting that simply arming
people with more information may not directly translate to more refined solutions to problems where
responses are driven by models. In a domain like information security, where information technology
(IT) users may be overwhelmed by a large amount of technical information, it is reasonable for
behaviours to be guided by readily accessible mental models of the situation. In fact, even for more
knowledgeable users, more specific and detailed information may be less easily retrievable than a
basic mental model.
The law of small numbers (Tversky and Kahneman 1971) also plays a role. Individuals may believe
that their own limited experience of information security is fully representative of all the threats faced.
Consequently, having “played the odds and won”, that is, emerging unscathed in spite of poor security
decisions (Camp 2009) will further reinforce their incomplete and perhaps unrepresentative mental
models of the situation. This perspective provides an appealing explanation for the abundant
situations in which individuals make security related decisions that may not be easily explained by
logical reasoning or inference.
“Folk” models which form through personal experience or stories shared among people in a
community (Keil 2010) may influence decisions so strongly that the mental model prevails even when
faced with conflicting evidence. In August of 1994, the Moura Mine disaster resulted in the deaths of
11 miners in Queensland, Australia. A subsequent investigation revealed that a gas explosion had been
caused by coal in an advanced stage of heating – evidence of which had been available for six weeks
prior to the disaster yet was either minimised or overlooked (Windridge 1996). This has been
attributed to a flawed folk model which held that coal takes six months to heat up to a dangerous level
(Chapman and Ferfolja 2001). As the warnings of coal heating were inconsistent with the mental
model, they were dismissed, leading expert individuals toward an incorrect course of action that was
not guided by the evidence in front of them. In an information systems context, warning signs and
evidence of security threats may be far less prominent. In fact, a great deal of research goes into trying
to address the large scale findings that IT users often fail to attend to security warnings (Akhawe and
Felt 2013). A further challenge is faced when users may take in security information, but fail to act on
it if it is not aligned to their mental model of the situation (Egelman et al. 2008).
This study was designed to identify beliefs about viruses and hackers that contribute to mental models
and estimate their prevalence in the IT end user population, giving insights into kinds of beliefs that
users may call upon when making security decisions. We also attempt to describe a set of prototype
models and sort users into these models to perform exploratory analysis linking mental models to
security behaviour.

2 Related Work
Mental models have been successfully used for risk communication in other disciplines, such as drug
risks (Jungermann et al. 1988), however they have failed to achieve widespread utilisation in the
information systems domain. Human computer interaction (HCI) practitioners are perhaps the most
familiar information systems professionals with the concept of mental models. Nielsen (1990)
describes two important elements of mental models: firstly the mental model is based on beliefs
rather than facts, and may therefore be imperfect or unclear. Secondly, individuals will each have their
own mental model; different users might even create different models of the same situation as the
model is based on their own understanding of reality. Usability issues arise when there is a mismatch
between the mental model of the developer and that of the technology user.
Mental models have received some attention in behavioural security research. Camp (2009) identified
five possible mental models that may be used to communicate information security risk. These include
Physical Security (e.g. locking doors and guarding assets), Medical (e.g. security hygiene can prevent
infection spread), Criminal (e.g. end users are targets of opportunity), Warfare (e.g. perimeter security
and constant diligence) and Market (e.g. costs versus benefits of security behaviours).
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Beliefs are the basic component of mental models and a particular mental model held may be viewed
as a set of these beliefs. The early work in deriving mental models of security has been largely
qualitative in nature (e.g. Bravo-Lillo et al. 2011; Wash 2010) as extensive interviews and discussions
are the ideal environment to explore beliefs and perceptions, when little is known about them.
However, to gain a broader, more generalisable understanding of mental models of security and the
roles they play larger scale quantitative studies are needed.
Wash (2010) conducted a qualitative study into how home computer users perceive various security
threats. An iterative methodology was followed in which semi-structured interviews were conducted
through several rounds of refinement. Respondents were selected by the researcher to ensure a large
variability and no prior training in computer security. Thus, the sample was not intended to be
generalised to the entire population of home computer users, but rather selected to reveal a wide
range of mental models and perceptions. Through this study he described folk models around
computer viruses and hackers. Four models of viruses were described: that viruses are Bad, Buggy
Software, Cause Mischief or Support Crime. Similarly, four models of computer hackers were
described: that hackers are Graffiti Artists, Burglars, Criminals or Contractors (to organised crime).
Subsequent research attempted to implement these mental models into a simulation environment.
Guided by the premise that behaviour is predicted by not only level of knowledge but also its
structure, Blythe and Camp (2012) showed that a simulated agent programmed with a mental model
can make similar decisions to a human. This supports the view that mental models may function like
simulations in the mind, allowing an individual to step though a situation before acting. Estimation of
how prevalent these models may be in the general population was described as an area for future work
(Wash 2010), and it is this gap that we aim to address in the current paper.
As mental models form from information that an individual believes to be true (Johnson-Laird et al.
1998), an expert mental model may differ from a non-expert user’s. Prior research confirms the
difference in beliefs and security behaviours of expert and non-expert users and suggests that in order
to deliver effective security advice, the users must first be understood (Ion et al. 2015). All users may
have the motivation to protect themselves against threats, but only those which they believe are real
and are part of their mental model (Wash and Rader 2011). It is possible that security advice (created
by experts) may be incompatible with the mental models and belief structures of non-expert users,
leading to some of the insecure behaviours observed. Wash and Rader (2011) suggested that there is a
need to ultimately eliminate the need for users to become more like security experts. This could be a
reality if we understand how prevalent different belief structures and models are, and tailor security
solutions based on this understanding.
More recently, Wash and Rader (2015) made a step toward quantifying some of the beliefs that may be
part of mental models. They created a survey instrument to measure beliefs about viruses and
hackers, and administered this to a Qualtrics survey panel of 1,993 United States based IT users. They
gathered data about three virus related beliefs (“Viruses create visible problems”, “You can protect
against viruses”, “Viruses are caught on the Internet”) and two hacker related beliefs (“Hackers target
home computer users”, “Hackers target others”) that were not considered to be mutually exclusive.
They were able to report on the prevalence of these beliefs in the wider IT user population. They also
attempted to group respondents using clustering approaches. This suggested that certain patterns of
beliefs (i.e. mental models) may be shared by a larger number of respondents. However, with their
results yielding a large number of possible clusters and a small number of beliefs measured (e.g. four
possible groups of users were used to describe the two hacker beliefs) further work is required to
elaborate on these prototype models before findings may be translated or generalised to real world
situations.

3 Research Method
This study was designed to extend prior work and attempt to estimate the prevalence of beliefs about
hackers and viruses held by IT users. The target population for the study was people who use IT (such
as computers, tablets and smartphones) for personal use. The unit of analysis was the individual user.
Data was collected through an anonymous online questionnaire.
In order to obtain a large and diverse sample, a third party recruitment firm was contracted to identify
potential participants in the United States. The recruitment firm contacted potential participants by
email and invited them to participate by completing the web based questionnaire. All participants
were 18 years or over and were advised that completion of the questionnaire was voluntary, and that
responses were anonymous.
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The questionnaire collected general background and demographic information about respondents
followed by a set of questions based around virus and hacker beliefs derived from the work of Wash
(2010) with the objective of quantifying the prevalence of his theorised folk models of security. Virus
and hacker beliefs were separated into individual items. The types of beliefs measured about viruses
were: Virus Creator, Virus Purpose, Virus Effect and Virus Transmission. The types of beliefs
measured about hackers were: Hacker Identify, Hacker Purpose, Hacker Target, Hacker Effect and
Hacker Work. For every type of belief an “Other” option was also created to accommodate the
possibility that the mental model profiles were incomplete. For instance Wash (2010) described three
possible beliefs of Virus Effects: General Bad things, Annoying Problems or Information Stolen. Virus
Effect was represented in our questionnaire as four items, three representing the original beliefs and
“Other”. Respondents were asked to rank these in order of their perceived importance. The full list of
these items is presented in Appendix 1.
For each user, the data collection yielded 19 data points about virus beliefs and 17 data points about
hacker beliefs. The current exploratory analysis did not require such granular data and these data
points were collapsed into categories. For virus beliefs, four categorical variables were created to
encode the respondent’s highest ranked choice for Virus Creator, Purpose, Effect and Transmission.
Similarly for hacker beliefs, five categorical variables encoded the highest ranked choice for Hacker
Identity, Purpose, Target, Effect and Work.
In order to facilitate exploration of relationships between mental models and security behaviour,
items to measure security behaviour, perceived severity and perceived vulnerability when using
mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets were included for approximately half of the
participants1. Security behaviour was measured using five items which asked the participant to state
whether or not they performed the behaviour. The items were chosen as representative of
recommended personal computing security behaviours and were scored as 1 for “Yes” or 0 for “No” or
“Unsure”. A composite variable was calculated as the sum of the responses to the five items. Both
perceived severity and perceived vulnerability are proposed as determinants of security behaviour in
research based on Protection Motivation Theory (Rogers 1975; 1983). There is evidence to support
their role (Crossler and Bélanger 2014; Liang and Xue 2010; Woon et al. 2005) and it may be that
these perceptions are influenced by mental models of security. Items to measure them were therefore
also included in the study. Six items were used to capture each construct, and they were each
measured on a 7 point Likert scale from 1 “Strongly Disagree” to 7 “Strongly Agree”. Details of the
items are available from McGill and Thompson (2017). Composite measures of perceived severity and
perceived vulnerability were calculated as the mean of the items.

4 Results
Data screening was undertaken to identify respondents who had not sufficiently engaged with the
study; 629 responses remained after removing responses with zero variance or those where
completion took either below half of the minimum estimated completion time or twice the maximum
estimated completion time (Huang et al. 2012). Of these, 20 were found to have only partially
answered the mental models questions, leaving a final usable sample size of 609. The gender
distribution of the sample was 61.7% female and 37.6% male.

4.1 Prevalence of Virus and Hacker Beliefs
Initial data analysis of the 609 responses revealed that certain beliefs were strongly held by a large
proportion of the users. For the virus data set, most users believed that the creators are either
mischievous or criminal and that the purpose and effect of viruses are related to information theft.
There was no strong preference for how viruses were transmitted with an almost even distribution
across the three choices. Table 1 reports the beliefs that respondents ranked as most relevant in the
virus data set. For space reasons only the two most popular beliefs are included, therefore the row
totals do not account for 100% of the respondents.

1

The remaining participants answered the same items, but about home computer and laptop use rather than
mobile device use, so were not included in the analysis.
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Category

Belief (Percent)

Belief (Percent)

Virus Creator

Mischievous (49%)

Criminal (34%)

Virus Purpose

Gather Info (67%)

Disruption (17%)

Virus Effect

Info Stolen (69%)

Annoying (15%)

Virus Transmission

Running File (39%)

Automatically (32%)

Table 1: Summary of virus beliefs
In the hacker data set there was more variance, but again certain beliefs appear to be more prominent
in the population. Hacker Purpose mirrors the findings in the virus data set with strong support for
finding information as the purpose of hacking. More than half of the respondents believed that anyone
can be a target of hackers, and that the effect is severe, causing lots of problems. These findings
suggest that users are indeed concerned about their personal information, and aware that it may be a
target. Respondents generally believed that hackers work either as part of an organised crime group or
independently. Finally, the most common belief of hacker identity is also that they are part of an
organised crime group, although results in this area are more evenly split across the three beliefs. As
with the previous example, we summarise hacker beliefs in a table form below, including the two most
common beliefs for each category.
Category

Belief (Percent)

Belief (Percent)

Hacker Purpose

Find Info (82%)

Mischief (14%)

Hacker Target

Anyone (54%)

Based on opportunity (35%)

Hacker Effect

Lots of problems (76%)

Possible computer problems (22%)

Hacker Work

Organised Crime (48%)

Independent (37%)

Hacker Identity

Organised Crime (39%)

Criminals (31%)

Table 2: Summary of hacker beliefs

4.2 Association Rule Mining
Association rule mining was the first technique employed to identify mental models. Association rule
mining may be understood from the perspective of shopping basket analysis. Retailers mine
transaction records, to learn which sets of items are commonly purchased together by their customers.
For instance, the recommended items presented to shoppers at an e-commerce site are based on
evidence that other shoppers have previously bought the items together; that is, they are somehow
associated. To evaluate the usefulness of these “item sets” that are revealed, a number of metrics are
employed, including confidence. Confidence percent is an indicator of how certain we are that when
one item is present the associated item will also be present. If, out of ten shopping baskets that
contain bread, four also contain milk, then there is a four out of ten or 40% confidence in this rule.
Emergence of a set of frequently held beliefs may indicate that a particular mental model is more
prevalent. Though individuals may hold multiple mental models, evidence of associations would
highlight which beliefs tend to be linked, and are stronger in the population. For instance, Wash
(2010) discussed folk models of viruses and hackers in terms of sets of beliefs although he did not
report how many users possessed each model. Thus, association rule mining was employed to explore
any potential associations between beliefs held.
For this analysis, RapidMiner Studio v7.5 (RapidMiner Inc. 2017) was utilised. To perform association
rule mining, the data must be presented as a series of true/false items. This is akin to searching the
shopping basket looking for items that tend to occur together. Data were pre-processed to convert the
categorical variables into binominal data and to map these values to true/false type statements. For
example “Virus Creator = Organised Crime” or “Virus Creator ≠ Young Technical Geeks”.
Next, the FP-Growth algorithm was applied to this data to look for frequent item sets. This process
applies the FP-tree data structure to identify frequent item sets (Han et al. 2000). This was executed
with a confidence parameter of 85% set as the threshold.
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Mining of the virus beliefs data yielded a handful of potential rules, all of which led to only two
(similar) outcomes: “Virus Effect = Information gets stolen”, and “Virus Purpose = Gather
Information”. These do not appear to reveal any further insights into the patterns of user beliefs,
beyond what is already apparent from the prevalence data described in Section 4.1. As high confidence
rules may occur by chance, further analysis is needed to determine whether there is statistical
independence of the antecedent and the outcome of the rule (McNicholas et al. 2008). Based on this
analysis, we concluded that the potential rules were not of interest.
Data from the hacker beliefs were subjected to the same treatment and rule mining. Again, the small
number of potential rules converged on only two beliefs: “Hacker Purpose = To look for Information”
and “Hacker Effect = Lots of Computer Problems”. It is apparent that beliefs about information theft
and data security are commonly held, however similar to the virus data, further investigation revealed
that the potential rules were not of interest. It was concluded that association rule mining was not
successful with this data set and that the relations between virus or hacker beliefs may be more
complex than a direct correlation between certain beliefs held. The next stage of exploratory analysis
was to discern if an unsupervised (i.e. machine led) data mining approach might reveal some
groupings of response data that would suggest patterns of mental models.

4.3 Clustering
Clustering is an unsupervised data mining approach in which items are grouped together such that
members of a cluster are more similar to each other than they are to items outside their cluster. This
may be performed with no a priori knowledge of the cluster characteristics, and subsequent analysis is
required to determine if the proposed clusters are actually meaningful. Thus, out of the myriad cluster
models and possible solutions, the “correct” one, if any, must often be determined by
experimentation. This clustering was also performed in RapidMiner Studio v7.5.
The mental model data being analysed was represented with a single variable for each belief to encode
the view held by the respondent. As this data is categorical in nature, k-medoids clustering was
applied (Kaufman and Rousseeuw 1987). The k-medoids algorithm nominates the “most centred” data
point in each cluster and iteratively scans through all other data points, deciding which cluster to
assign them based on their similarity to the centre. As a rule of thumb, an attempt was made to find a
value for k (number of clusters) such that there would be no needlessly small clusters, and that the
number of clusters was low. This is in order to attain the most generalisable and simple solution and
to reduce the risk of over-fitting (i.e. modelling random error or noise instead of the underlying
relationship).
For the virus data set, possible solutions were found with either two or three clusters. The three
cluster model consisted of one large and two smaller clusters. These superficially appeared to
represent three sets of beliefs, although more detailed analysis revealed that there were minimal
differences between the smaller clusters and a two cluster model was considered more appropriate. A
two cluster model was accepted which yielded n=466 and n=143.
With beliefs about hackers, the results were less clear-cut. The clustering models that were explored
often did not converge on a solution that had much real-world explanatory power. After removing the
two factors that had the least predictive relevance, Hacker Target and Hacker Effect, the k-medoids
algorithm was once again applied to the remaining data set. Two clusters were found with a
reasonably even split of n=319 and n=290.
Evaluation of the “quality” of a cluster model is subjective. Numerical measures such as DaviesBouldin index (Davies and Bouldin 1979), typically built into data mining tools, evaluate intra-cluster
similarity and inter-cluster differences. These values describe how close together data points are
grouped into clusters, however shed little light onto whether there is any inherent meaning in the
groupings. As there was no ground truth against which to compare our models, descriptive measures
discussing the observable patterns within the clusters were employed to understand the exploratory
work. In the next section we describe the clusters in terms of the beliefs that are commonly held by
members of each cluster and suggest prototype models to explain the perspective of each set of users.

4.4 Mental Models about Viruses
Virus mental model cluster 1 hold the Criminal Enterprise mental model of viruses and 76% of the
sample belong to this cluster. Members consider virus creators to be either mischievous (50%) or
criminal (35%) in nature. Consistent with criminal activity being traditionally associated with
activities such as theft or fraud, those with this mental model strongly believe that the purpose of a
computer virus is to gather information (82%). Unsurprisingly, they also overwhelmingly associate
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the effect of a virus infection to be that information is stolen (84%). The mode of transmission of the
virus is seen as being automatic in nature or installed by a hacker (41%) and to a lesser extent by
running a file (30%).
Cluster 2 hold the Mischief mental model of viruses, and the remaining 24% of the sample belong to
this cluster. Although holding similar views of virus creators to those in Cluster 1, that is, that they are
mischievous (45%) or criminals (31%), beliefs around virus purpose diverge more clearly. Those
holding the Mischief mental model do not consider information theft as a primary purpose of viruses.
Rather they rank disruption (54%) and mischief (22%) as the main purposes. In keeping with a
perception of Mischief, the perceived effect of a virus is that the “Computer runs badly” (48%) or there
are “Annoying problems” (27%). Although respondents describe potentially frustrating situations,
these views suggest that those in this cluster may perceive a lower severity of virus infection. Finally,
the mode of transmission of viruses is seen to be largely from “Running infected files” (71%). Rather
than seeing themselves as potential victims of a criminal enterprise, those holding this mental model
may simply consider malware and viruses as annoyances – perhaps even a hazard of regular internet
use.

4.5 Mental Models about Hackers
Hacker mental model cluster 1 hold the Independent model of hackers and 52% of the sample belong
to this cluster. They believe that the hacker identity is primarily young techies (40%) or criminals in
general (33%). Those with the Independent mental model believe that the purpose of hacking is most
commonly to find information (72%), but also to a lesser extent for general mischief (21%). They
believe that hackers generally work independently (70%) and this appears to be the defining
characteristic of this mental model.
Cluster 2 hold the Organised Crime model of hackers and the remaining 48% of the sample belong to
this cluster. Members consider the identity of hackers to mostly be organised crime (58%), followed by
criminals in general (29%). The perceived purpose of hacking for this cluster is almost universally to
find information (93%). They also universally (100%) believe that hackers work as part of organised
crime units. It is likely that the identity of a hacker and their work unit are prominent characteristics
of a user’s mental model about hackers.
Beliefs about the targets and effect of hacking were not used as variables for clustering, as these had
little predictive power and their inclusion made little difference to the outcome of the clustering
model. Cluster 1 and Cluster 2 both consider that hackers target anyone (57% and 52%) and are
opportunistic (34% and 36%). Similarly, both clusters also consider that the effect of a hack is to cause
a large number of computer problems (73% and 78% respectively).

4.6 Influence on Behaviour
As discussed in Section 2 above, mental models are believed to play a role in security behaviour (e.g.
Camp 2009; Wash and Rader 2011). There has, however, been little research directly measuring
whether this is the case. In order to explore whether the mental models identified in this study were
associated with users’ security behaviour, and how any associations might relate to perceptions of
severity or vulnerability, exploratory analyses were undertaken to evaluate our mental model data
alongside more traditional user security behaviour data. Table 3 shows the mean levels of security
behaviour and security perceptions for the two virus belief clusters. As can be seen, the Criminal
Enterprise cluster had higher average levels of security behaviour, perceived severity and perceived
vulnerability. To further explore these potential differences, non-parametric Mann-Whitney U tests
were used to determine if there were significant differences in security behaviour or perceptions
between people holding different mental models of viruses. Mann-Whitney U tests were used rather
than t-tests as the data did not meet the assumption of normality. The Mann-Whitney U test tests the
hypothesis that two independent samples are likely to derive from the same population, and does not
require the assumption of normal distributions. No significant differences in levels of security
behaviour were found between those in the Criminal Enterprise cluster and those in the Mischief
cluster (U=6,714.0, Z=-1.200, p=0.230). Levels of perceived severity were, however, significantly
higher for those in the Criminal Enterprise cluster (U=5,964.5, Z=-2.441, p=0.015), but levels of
perceived vulnerability were not significantly different (U=6,989.5, Z=-0.730, p=0.465). Users in both
clusters believe that they can be a target and their levels of perceived vulnerability are not significantly
different. Similarly, there is no significant difference between the levels of security behaviours
undertaken. However, users in the Criminal Enterprise cluster had significantly higher levels of
perceived severity, indicating that if users believe that criminal enterprises are responsible for security
issues the threats may be perceived as more severe than if they are believed to be a result of mischief.
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Criminal Enterprise
(N=236)

Mischief (N=63)

Significant
Difference?

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Security behaviour

2.26

1.65

1.97

1.36

No

Perceived severity

5.85

1.30

5.54

1.27

Yes

Perceived vulnerability

4.71

1.42

4.53

1.24

No

Table 3. Virus belief cluster comparison
Table 4 provides a similar comparison for the two hacker belief clusters. As can be seen, the
Organised Crime cluster had higher levels of security behaviour, perceived severity and perceived
vulnerability. The differences between clusters were significant for security behaviour (U=9,587.5, Z=2.123, p=0.034) and perceived severity (U=9,564.5, Z=-2.147, p=0.032). The difference in the levels of
perceived vulnerability were not, however, significant (U=9,833.5, Z=--1.761, p=0.078). Again, users
in both clusters believe they are relatively vulnerable, with no significant differences observed in levels
of perceived vulnerability between the clusters. This finding is consistent with the results reported in
Section 4.1 where 54% of respondents reported that the target of a hack could be anyone and 35%
reported that targets were determined based on opportunity. Users in the Organised Crime cluster,
however, have significantly higher levels of perceived severity than those who believe that hackers are
Independent. Mirroring this trend, the levels of security behaviour are higher for those in the
Organised Crime cluster.
Independent (N=157)

Organised Crime
(N=142)

Significant
Difference?

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Security behaviour

2.01

1.56

2.41

1.61

Yes

Perceived severity

5.64

1.35

5.95

1.21

Yes

Perceived vulnerability

4.55

1.37

4.82

1.39

No

Table 4. Hacker belief cluster comparison

5 Discussion and Conclusion
We have presented a set of prototype mental models that can be used to describe users in terms of
commonly held beliefs. For viruses these are the Criminal Enterprise and Mischief models, with the
Criminal Enterprise model more prevalent. For hackers these are the Independent and Organised
Crime models, which are were of almost equal prevalence. Prior work has shown that the mental
model held by an individual influences their reasoning and decision making. For instance, people who
hold a simplistic view of electricity as something that flows like water may employ a mental model of a
garden hose. These individuals then go on to connect a battery to a bulb with a single wire, so that
electricity from the storage tank (battery) may trickle through the wire to the bulb (Tarciso Borges and
Gilbert 1999). Holding an incomplete or flawed mental model may lead a user to make decisions that
they believe are rational and sensible, but may be flawed (Keil 2010). This provides a new perspective
to explain the apparently non-rational choices that users make.
Our exploratory analysis of differences in security behaviour between those holding different mental
model of security threats addresses Wash and Rader’s (2011) call for more research on how mental
models influence security behaviour. The results not only show that mental models can be associated
with different levels of security behaviour, but provide a starting point as to how this may occur. For
example, users who believe virus creators to have criminal intent, rather than being merely
mischievous, have higher levels of perceived severity of threat and this has been shown in many
studies to influence security behaviour (e.g., Posey et al. 2015; Siponen et al. 2014; Vance et al. 2012).
Similarly, users who hold the Organised Crime model of hackers have higher levels of perceived
severity of threat. Linking mental models of security to the body of quantitative research using models
such as Protection Motivation Theory (Rogers 1975; 1983) provides a promising way forward.
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A limitation of our work is that the data gathered about security beliefs is constrained to a set of
beliefs described in previous research. Expanding this to a larger set of data points may improve the
outcomes of the data mining and provide deeper insights into IT users’ mental models. Another
interesting area for future work may be to examine the kinds of situations in which mental models or
heuristics are employed during security decision making and contrast this with the use of more
methodical approaches. It is possible that the environment and context influence the decision making
strategies employed and thus have an impact on IT users’ behaviour.
Prior work has shown that incorrect mental models can lead to insecure behaviours (Egelman et al.
2008) and suggests that some of the widespread security issues faced by the public may be heightened
by mismatches between developers’ perspectives and those of end users. For example, it is possible
that some of the rising issues concerning the insecurity of Internet of Things devices may be in part
due to users not viewing such devices with the same mental model as applied to a regular computer,
even though there are many commonalities.
Research suggests that security experts (e.g. developers) hold different mental models to non-experts
(e.g. users) (Ion et al. 2015; Wash and Rader 2011). HCI designers have recognised the issues that
arise when developers and users possess different models and attempt to mitigate this risk during
design. However, this does not appear to be done in information security. Instead of attempting to
simply lay the blame on the end user, or expecting them to change, developers can do their part. Wash
and Rader (2011) suggest that the need for users to become more like security experts in order to be
more secure may be alleviated by changing mental models. Mental models however, resist change,
and this can be a significant roadblock for any intervention that requires the users to adjust their
beliefs (Duffy 2003). Therefore, we not only support the suggestions of Wash and Rader but also
propose that developers should learn about the mental models held by users. By understanding the
beliefs that users already hold, developers may tailor an experience and environment that is consistent
with users’ expectations and may enable them to make security decisions that are as effective as the
users believe they are.
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Appendix 1 – Questionnaire Items
Virus belief items
The following questions were used to capture participants’ understanding and experience of computer
viruses.
Viruses are created by :
Criminals
Mischievous
hackers

Bad people

They are not
created on
purpose

Corporations

Other

Purpose of viruses is to :
Gather
Cause mischief
No real purpose
Disrupt/corrupt
Other, not
information for
and annoy people
government or
mentioned above
identity theft or
business systems
fraud
The effect of virus infection is that :
Information gets stolen Annoying problems are The computer runs
Other, not mentioned
for criminal purposes
caused for users
badly
above
Viruses are transmitted by :
Automatically spread
Passively caught by
By inadvertently
Other, not mentioned
or installed by hackers
viewing shady websites downloading and
above
or emails
running an infected file
Hacker belief items
The following questions were used to capture participants’ understanding and experience of computer
hackers.
Hackers are usually :
Young technical geeks

Criminals

The way hackers work is :
Independently
To impress
friends
Hackers break in to :
Cause mischief

Professional organized
criminals
No real pattern

As part of a
criminal
organization

Look for financial and personal
information

Other, not mentioned
above
Other, not
mentioned above

Other, not mentioned above

The effect of a break in is :
Lots of computer problems,
Possible computer problems
No harm to computer, it will
software might have to be
run fine
reinstalled
Hackers usually target
Anyone, it doesn’t
Opportunity, it could
Not me, they only look
Not me, they only look
matter
be me
for rich important
for large databases of
people
information
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